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Turbulence ahead: 
disputes within the Russian ruling elite are gathering force
Jadwiga Rogoża
The last month has seen a public confrontation between Igor Sechin, the pre-
sident of Rosneft, and Arkady Dvorkovich, the deputy prime minister, concer-
ning the consolidation of the energy sector. This is the latest in a series of di-
sputes between the Kremlin & businessmen from Putin’s inner circle on one 
side, and the government & Prime Minister Medvedev on the other. These 
disputes have been wide-ranging in nature, concerning economic policy, the 
scope of competency of individual members of the elite, but also the ‘tough 
line’ adopted by the Kremlin since Vladimir Putin’s return to the presidency.
The Kremlin, which is still the main decision-making centre in Russia, has 
been effectively forcing its opinions through in its short-term disputes with the 
government. However, a new element in the ongoing conflicts, which is unfa-
vourable to President Putin, is their exceptional strength, their much more pu-
blic nature, and their wide range (which has included criticism of the president 
himself) and ever-changing context, especially the worsening socio-economic 
situation. These conflicts have been overlapping with signs of dissent among 
Putin’s business supporters, and their declining political willingness to support 
the leader unconditionally. The Kremlin’s response to the unrest consists of 
intensifying efforts to discipline the elite and weakening those groups in which 
Vladimir Putin has limited confidence. The elite’s support is crucial to the 
stability of his government; to maintain this support, the Kremlin is ready to 
introduce restrictive and repressive actions against both parliamentarians and 
government officials. In the short term, such a policy will force the Kremlin’s 
supporters back into obedience, but fears of a further increase in repression 
are also starting to be expressed on the sidelines.
Medvedev in dispute with the Kremlin
After Vladimir Putin’s return to the Kremlin, a worsening of the public disputes and conflicts 
between the president & his supporters and Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev & selected 
members of his Cabinet became apparent. These disputes may conventionally be divided 
into four groups: matters of competency, the economy, ideology and prestige.
The disputes over competency are related to the Kremlin’s ‘recovery’ of the powers which 
were delegated to the Government during Putin’s time as prime minister. The first public 
dispute between the government and the Kremlin was initiated by the establishment in June 
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Since Vladimir Putin’s return 
to the Kremlin, the conflicts between 
the president and Medvedev’s govern-
ment on matters of competency, 
the economy, ideology and image 
have become apparent. 
of the President’s energy committee1, which not only duplicated the functions of a similar 
government commission, but also assumed broad powers to regulate the energy sector. 
Medvedev and the deputy prime minister for energy Arkady Dvorkovich (head of the govern-
ment commission) particularly objected to the extensive competency given to the presiden-
tial committee’s secretary Igor Sechin (president of Rosneft and head of Rosneftegaz’s board 
of directors). While working on the committee’s competency, the government managed to 
limit the secretary’s formal powers; but this was not equivalent to limiting Sechin’s decisive 
de facto influence over the energy sector.
Another controversy over competency was the change in the procedure for appointing the 
heads of large companies in which the state holds shares. In August, a decision by Pre-
sident Putin strengthened the Kremlin’s impact on how these positions were staffed: it 
gained the formal right to approve or reject 
candidates put forward by the government 
for several major companies’ boards of di-
rectors2. The way in which these positions 
were filled clearly shows that Putin does 
not intend to give up his right to take key 
personnel decisions. Putin appointed Se-
chin chairman of the board of directors of 
Rosneftegaz (an important state company 
which controls Rosneft and 10% of Gazprom) on his last day as Prime Minister (6 May). 
Medvedev’s government, which was appointed the next day, was most probably not infor-
med of this decision, as it held consultations on the position for some months afterwards, 
with Medvedev himself signalling that he will prolong the process for nominating Sechin, 
with whom he is not on the best of terms3.
The public dispute over economic policy between Deputy Prime Minister Dvorkovich and 
the Kremlin was rooted in the state’s policy on the electricity sector. The concept for conso-
lidating this area, as presented by Igor Sechin, was based on the acquisition by Rosneftegaz 
(which Sechin controls) of a number of large companies in the power sector – the power 
grid holdings FSK and MRSK; RusHydro, the largest grouping of hydroelectric power plants; 
and the InterRAO power company. In addition, Rosneftegaz has started talks to take over 
several regional generating companies from Viktor Vekselberg’s KES holding. Rosneftegaz 
is prepared to expand into the electricity sector: President Putin’s decree in May gives the 
company the right to participate in the privatisation of the energy sector4. Sechin’s plans 
were again opposed by Deputy Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich: on 10 August he sent 
a letter in the government’s name to President Putin, wherein he warned that the concept 
Sechin proposed for consolidating the electricity sector under the aegis of Rosneftegaz wo-
uld lead to an effective reduction in state control over the sector, and would require exces-
sive financial expenditure. As an alternative, Dvorkovich called for the money Rosneftegaz 
makes to be used for the capitalisation of the power companies, but without putting them 
under Rosneftegaz’s control. Dvorkovich’s opposition can be seen both in terms of the merits 
of the dispute (a vision of a more decentralised economy), as well as an attempt to limit 
Sechin’s role as the most influential player in the energy sector. However, Dvorkovich and 
the government failed this time as well. The deputy PM’s letter to the President remained 
unanswered; the media stated unofficially that it had been sent on for “further consulta-
tions”, to be coordinated by Sechin’s longtime collaborator Anton Ustinov, who is currently 
an advisor to the president. Putin himself is supposed to have ordered an acceleration in 
the capitalisation of RusHydro, in accordance with Sechin’s plans. Dvorkovich had the letter 
published in the press5, thus making the conflict public, but this decision should in fact be 
seen as a manifestation of his helplessness.
1 The RF President’s Commis-
sion on the Strategic Develop-
ment of the Fuel and Energy 
Complex and Environmental 
Security was established on 
15 June by a decree from 
President Putin. For more, 
see Ewa Paszyc, ‘The ”energy 
tandem”: Putin and Sechin 
control the Russian energy 
sector’, Eastweek OSW, 
20 June 2012.
2 Formerly in the sole discre-
tion of the government; the 
Kremlin only had this right 
with regard to selected ‘stra-
tegic’ companies. For more, 
see ‘Priamoye prezidentskoye 
upravleniye’, Kommersant, 
22 August 2012.
3 See ‘Sechin mog poluchit 
krieslo v ‘Rosneftegazye’ bez 
vedoma Medvedeva’, Vedomo-
sti, 15 August 2012.
4 The presidential decree 
of 22 May. For more, see 
‘Privatizatsya po siechinski’, 
Vedomosti, 28 August 2012.
5 See ‘Pismo Dvorkovicha prezi-
dentu o privatizatsyi v TEK-ie’, 
Vedomosti, 24 August 2012.
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Differences in ideological matters between Medvedev and Putin & his entourage have also 
surfaced, which has led to a de facto clash between the Kremlin and the government. These 
differences primarily relate to the Kremlin’s ‘tough line’ on domestic policy which has been 
observed since Putin’s return to the presidency. The government has opposed individual 
legal changes initiated by the Kremlin and aimed at opposition and social activists, including 
an amendment to the act on the protection of children (which could effectively lead to tighte-
ning control over the Internet), and an act prohibiting the advertising of alcohol in the media 
(which would be a blow to independent media). Medvedev also distanced himself from a bill 
(which Putin publicly supported) prohibiting government officials from possessing property 
and bank accounts located overseas. Medvedev saw this plan as a deterrent to discourage 
entrepreneurs from working in the administration, which would not be conducive to streng-
thening the rule of law. In addition, Medvedev criticised the prison sentence handed down 
to the members of the band Pussy Riot, noting that a suspended sentence would have been 
more appropriate; this also contrasted with Putin’s assessment of the case.
Finally, controversy has arisen in relations between Medvedev and the Kremlin which de-
monstrates their rivalry in matters of prestige and image. Medvedev’s government has be-
gun to receive public and ostentatious criticism from the President for inefficiency. At a me-
eting at Putin’s residence in Sochi on 18 
September, which was held in the absence 
of Prime Minister Medvedev, government 
ministers were severely scolded for failing 
to implement the President’s decrees, as 
well as for “systemic failure”. Another blow 
to the image of Dmitri Medvedev as the 
formal chairman of United Russia was the 
party’s repeated manifestation that it considers Vladimir Putin to be its true leader. During 
voting in parliament on projects where Medvedev’s government opposed the Presidential Ad-
ministration, the party unequivocally came down on the Kremlin’s side, ignoring the opinions 
of the government and the Prime Minister6. Finally, another blow to Medvedev’s image has 
been the gradual turning away from his ‘flagship’ initiatives: the introduction of the govern-
ment’s strict control over the election of governors (Medvedev had initiated the restoration 
of the direct election of regional governors); the extension of the retirement age for civil se-
rvants to 70 (reduced by Medvedev to 60); and the restoration of the change from summer 
to winter time (which had also been eliminated at Medvedev’s initiative).
The Prime Minister and his close associates have also become the object of a campaign to 
discredit them which, we may assume, has been sanctioned by President Putin. In July, 
a story went round the Russian media, according to which businessmen close to Medvedev 
had been taking over attractive assets and winning lucrative tenders7. The mediator in many 
of these operations was alleged to be the current Deputy Prime Minister, Arkady Dvorkovich. 
Moreover, another serious attempt to discredit Medvedev as a politician was the documenta-
ry ‘The Lost Day’, posted online in August, which tells the story of the war between Russia 
and Georgia in 20088. The film shows the former president as a politician incapable of inde-
pendent decision, and the then Prime Minister Putin as being the real decision maker. The 
media reported that the film was produced by the 5-Kanal TV station (which is run by Yuri 
Kovalchuk, a close friend of Putin), although the station itself denied this. The film disturbed 
Medvedev, who after the broadcast stated that he had decided to launch the military ope-
ration “on his own, and at the right time”. Vladimir Putin gave evasive answers when asked 
to comment, and did not dismiss the ideas presented in the film.
6 See the aforementioned acts 
on the protection of children 
and the prohibition of alcohol 
advertising in the media. The 
government reported its con-
cerns regarding these laws and 
delayed their formal approval, 
but the parliament passed it 
on 6 July thanks to votes from 
United Russia. See ‘Realny 
lider Yedinoy Rossii opredel-
itsia golosovaniyem po dvum 
zakonoproyektam’, Vedomosti, 
6 July 2012.
7 See ‘Summa interesov pre-
miera’, Kompaniya, 
23 July 2012. http://ko.ru/
articles/24238
8 http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=sYQeeFXhOQw
Dmitri Medvedev’s ‘flagship’ 
initiatives have been derailed 
one by one,and the PM and his 
supporters have been the subject 
of campaigns discrediting them. 
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The first signs of the disputes among Putin’s business partners
In parallel with the public polemics between the Kremlin and the government, symptoms of 
conflicts are beginning to appear among Vladimir Putin’s long-standing colleagues within his 
narrow business environment.
One party to one of the most visible conflicts is Gennady Timchenko, an oil trader who is re-
garded as one of Putin’s closest business partners. In the past decade he has risen from be-
ing a small intermediary company owner to the world’s fourth-ranked oil trader. So far (both 
during Medvedev’s presidency and during the economic crisis), Timchenko’s businesses 
have recorded spectacular expansion in various sectors: exports of oil and oil products, oil 
processing, and the gas and construction sectors. However, recent events have shown that 
Timchenko is beginning to lose oil export contracts. Rosneft, a company associated with the 
ruling elite (and controlled by Igor Sechin), as well as Surgutneftegaz and other companies, 
have ceased using Timchenko’s company Gunvor as an intermediary. Gunvor’s participation 
in exporting Russian oil has dropped recently from 40% to 15%9. Managers associated with 
Timchenko are being gradually removed from Rosneft, which Sechin controls10. Timchenko 
may also be running into problems in the gas sector. Gazprom has been forced to reduce 
output by the decline in demand for Russian gas in Europe, and so it has announced that it 
will stop making gas purchases from independent domestic producers, including Novatek, 
which Timchenko controls11. For now Novatek has ensured that the purchase of gas is con-
tinuing, but it has also reported that the two companies are holding talks on the matter, and 
has even threatened to break off its contracts with Gazprom.
So far, the winner in these business disputes has been Igor Sechin. He has been running a suc-
cessful personnel policy: he has sacked managers linked to other lobbyists (including the mana-
gers at Rosneft linked to Timchenko mentioned above), and had people close to him appointed 
to government ministries (such as the energy minister Aleksandr Novak) and the President’s 
Administration (Putin’s adviser Anton Ustinov). Sechin and his subordinate structures have 
achieved spectacular expansion in one 
area after another: he has won a domi-
nant position for himself in the oil sector 
(as a former deputy prime minister for 
energy and president of Rosneft, which is 
now in talks to take over BP’s package in 
TNK-BP), strengthened his place on the 
gas market (Rosneft is now one of the lar-
gest producers of natural gas), and has become secretary of the presidential committee on 
energy. His proposed acquisition of assets in the power sector would make him the most 
important player in the field. Such expansion would be impossible without strong support 
from Vladimir Putin; the basis for this seems to be Putin’s desire to balance out the influen-
ce of his individual business supporters (previously Timchenko, Arkady Rotenberg and Yuri 
Kovalchuk had expanded their fields of influence to similar degrees).
The new quality of the disputes
Disputes like these surrounding Vladimir Putin are not a new phenomenon; tension and 
rivalry among different groups in the elite have accompanied Putin’s governments from the 
beginning, and have focused mainly on how the spheres of influence, assets and resour-
ces were to be divided up12. But now in these latest disputes, which have been ongoing 
since Putin’s return to the Kremlin, we see a new quality: an unprecedented openness in 
the arguments, an expansion of their scope, and a change in the socio-political realities 
9 See ‘Druzya possorilis iz-za 
nefti’, Gazeta.ru, 15 Septem-
ber 2012. 
10 The last such decision was the 
removal in September from 
Rosneft’s board of directors 
of Eduard Khudaynatov, who 
had previously been president 
of the company. See ‘Sovyet 
Sechina’, Gazeta.ru, 18 Sep-
tember 2012.
11 Novatek sells Gazprom 28%of 
its gas. In addition to Novatek, 
the reductions may affect Sur-
gutneftegaz and Rosneft. See 
‘Gazprom zakryt’, Vedomosti, 
10 September 2012. 
12 See Jadwiga Rogoża, “The 
Power Gained, We Will Never 
Surrender”, OSW Policy Brief, 
October 2009.
In Russia, symptoms of conflicts 
have been appearing among Vladimir 
Putin’s business supporters, including 
the head of Rosneft, Igor Sechin, and 
the oil trader Gennady Timchenko. 
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which form the context for the conflicts within the elite, and so increase their resonance.
Firstly, the public disputes have reached an exceptional scale in recent months. Dissent at 
the Kremlin’s ‘general line’ is being expressed by current members of Vladimir Putin’s team 
– his prime minister and ministers, certain businessmen, experts close to power, and even 
members of United Russia (although much of this dissent is only uttered informally and 
anonymously). Some officials have even consciously publicised these behind-the-scenes 
disputes, as Dvorkovich did by publishing his letter to President Putin in the press, thus 
appealing to a wider circle of observers. The internet has also fostered the publicising of 
these disputes.
Secondly, these disputes concern not only business and financial issues, but also ideologi-
cal and programmatic issues. And so for the first time, the leader’s policies have come in 
for questioning. At issue is the particular attitude towards the ‘tough line’ that the Kremlin 
has adopted since Putin’s return to power, which can strike not only at opponents of the 
authorities (the opposition, NGOs, bloggers, volunteers and others), but also at the broader 
Kremlin camp itself. One example of this 
may be the removal of the parliamenta-
ry mandate from Gennady Gudkov of the 
Just Russia party after his active partici-
pation in anti-Kremlin protests. The Duma 
voted to deprive Gudkov of his mandate 
on suspicion of illegal business activity (in 
Russia there is a formal ban on any link 
between functions of state and business 
activity). Although United Russia’s de-
puties voted as directed by the Kremlin, many of them privately expressed concern that 
a dangerous precedent was being set; it is an open secret that the majority of Russian 
officials and parliamentarians conduct business activity, which their positions in the power 
structure allow them to benefit from.
Thirdly, changes are taking place in the context of the disputes within the elite because of 
the country’s ongoing political and social instability, and the prospects of economic down-
turn. Putin’s political position is currently weaker than it was during his previous presidential 
term (2000-2008), while his opponents are mobilised and far more numerous. Criticism of 
the president is beginning to be heard from groups that have so far been a stable part of his 
social base; for example, workers at the Ural smelters which are going bankrupt have been 
criticising Putin, accusing him of policies detrimental to the industry13. Putin’s poll ratings 
have been showing a downward trend14, and a deepening of fatigue with the current pre-
sident’s rule is also apparent: half of the poll’s respondents wanted Putin’s current term to 
be his last15. Experts predict a further increase in social unrest in connection with the next 
wave of the economic crisis, constantly rising costs and the unsatisfactory state of social 
security (the health service et al.).
The Kremlin’s reaction: disciplining the team
In response to the mobilisation of opposition and civic activists, the Kremlin has been taking 
consistent steps to prevent their activity16. However, a new element of the Kremlin’s strategy 
is to seek to discipline its own supporters, and to weaken these groups in the elite in which 
Vladimir Putin has limited confidence.
As we may assume, these groups of ‘limited confidence’ now include Medvedev and his 
entourage. The Kremlin is starting to treat them as a group that will not necessarily support 
the president in the event of an escalation of problems, and will rather try to build up its 
13 See ‘Golodayushchiye rabochi-
ye Urala zayavili o niedoverii 
Putinu’, Ura.ru, 9 April 2012, 
(http://ura.ru/content/svrd/04-
09-2012/news/1052147091.
html).
14 See the Levada Centre’s 
popularity poll of 23 August 
2012, as well as the FOM 
polls (http://fom.ru/indikatory.
html#?vt=47&s=47), and 
from 1-2 September 2012 
(http://bd.fom.ru/report/
map/dominant/dom3512/
d351201).
15 According to the Levada Cen-
tre poll of 24 August 2012, 
49% of respondents would like 
a new person to be elected 
president in 2018 (22% want 
to see Putin in the Kremlin, 
7% Medvedev, and 22% 
expressed no opinion).
16 For more, see Jadwiga Rogoża, 
‘Restrictions versus protests: 
the government hinders oppo-
sition activity’, Eastweek OSW, 
25 July 2012.
A new element in the disputes 
around Putin is their unusual tension, 
their public nature, their wide range 
(including criticism of the president’s 
policies) and the complex socio- 
-economic situation, which increases 
the resonance of the disputes. 
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own political capital by playing on such instability. In this context, Medvedev’s statement 
ahead of this March’s presidential elections may have been a negative signal to Putin, when 
he admitted that a second round of voting would be necessary (Putin’s people expressed 
confidence that he would win in the first round). Medvedev’s statements may also suggest 
that he has not given up the idea of returning to make a play for the leadership – he has 
announced on several occasions that he is interested in returning to the Kremlin in the 
future17. In addition, the President’s trust of Medvedev may have been diminished by the 
critical response from the latter and his circle to further restrictive initiatives coming from the 
President’s Administration. At the same time, Medvedev’s critical attitude can be seen as 
a signal to that part of the state administration which is most concerned about these chan-
ges, suggesting that he personally favours 
a more benign course.
In response to public signs of criticism wi-
thin the ranks of the state administration, 
the Kremlin has taken steps to tighten 
control over the bureaucracy, and act as 
a deterrent. This is most likely a signal that 
the Kremlin has the tools to punish those 
officials who demonstrate political disloyal-
ty. These activities include depriving Duma deputy Gudkov of his mandate, as already men-
tioned, and the draft law which prohibits officials from possessing property and accounts 
abroad. Gudkov’s punishment itself seems to be more than just a signal to the authorities’ 
opponents (the Kremlin is not counting on winning any sympathy that way), but also to their 
own people – officials, parliamentarians, and businessmen.
The government camp is now showing signs of unrest, intensified by social tensions and 
a drop in support for the government, as can best be seen in the poorer showing for United 
Russia in December’s parliamentary elections. The weakening of the ‘party of power’ has 
already led to the fact that during the regional elections, United Russia’s members distan-
ced themselves from the party and ran as independents, and some even resigned from the 
party in an ostentatious manner. Another factor that may stoke unrest and disputes within 
the elite (mainly among the businessmen in Putin’s circle) is the prospect of the worsening 
economic crisis and a budget deficit. In view of the negative forecasts, one of the Kremlin’s 
main priorities is now to halt the erosion of support from the elite, as it is exactly the mood 
of this group – both the narrow circle of the president’s trusted colleagues, and the wider 
public administration – which will be crucial for the stability of Vladimir Putin’s government.
In response to the signs of dissent 
within the administration, 
the Kremlin is leaning towards 
disciplining its own team, and weak-
ening those groups within the elite 
in whom Putin has limited confidence. 
17 Speeches of 25 January 
2012 and 16 February 
2012, as well as in an 
interview with The Times 
on 30 July 2012 (granted 
while Medvedev was 
attending the Olympics 
in London).
